than the Mahayana perspective of Tibetan yoga, K. N. Jayatilleke's observations about the particular issue of levels of understanding in Buddhist epistemology are not as unlike those of Guenther as one might suppose. While he sees the epistemology of early Buddhism as fundamentally empirical rather than intuitive, he stretches the term empirical to include transempirical states (that is, nirvlitJa) and extrasensory data. Empirical knowledge, then, in Jayatilleke's usage is very similar to Guenther's claim that saving knowledge in Buddhism is "knowledge by acquaintance" and not "knowledge by description."7 Furthermore, just as Guenther contends that levels of understanding are distinct but that finally or ultimately there is only one truth, so J ayatilleke argues that in the Pali texts the two differing levels of understanding-direct ( n'itattha) and indirect ( neyyattha )-lead to one truth. This truth or state of being cannot be described or understood rationally, but it can be realized and attained. 8 Thus, like Guenther, Jayatilleke is claiming that although there are distinct levels of understanding or modes of knowing they are ultimately resolved in a nonpropositional truth which can be realized "intuitively" but not known discursively.
A more general consideration of this issue, but one which is germane to a proposal I will make below, is offered by D.T. Suzuki. Suzuki juxtaposes discursive and intuitive levels of understanding in the terms of vijiianajniiiiiii~a and prajiiiifpaiiiili. He claims that the two are always contrasted in Buddhist thought: that vijiiana is the mode of knowledge appropriate to the world of the senses and the intellect characterized by the duality between the seer and the seen, and that prajiiii is the fundamental noetic principle whereby the synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible. 9 As methods of knowing Suzuki finds vijiiana and prajiia standing diametrically opposed. Vijiiana is the principle of analysis and conceptualization whereas prajiia always aims at synthesis and unity. Yet, despite their differing functions, Suzuki believes the two complement each other and that vijiiana cannot function without being based in prajiia. P.T. Raju states Suzuki's point in the following manner, "thought [ vijiiana] cannot work without intuitions [prajiia] and intuitions cannot be understood without thought, and ... the distinctions between thought and intuition cannot be clear-cut." 10 Building on some of the suggestions from the studies cited above, I propose to investigate the problem of the relationship that may obtain between levels of understanding or modes of knowing in selected Pali suttas using viiiiii1~a and paiiiiii as the two fundamental types suggested by Guenther and J aya- 7 Ibid., p. 27.
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tilleke. At the outset it is important to keep in mind that I am not using them as mutually exclusive terms, but as broad categories or types of knowledge which are-as suggested by both Guenther and J ayatilleke-distinct but related to each other within the experiential matrix of the soteriological quest. As viiiiiii1Ja and paiiiia are being considered primarily as types of knowledge it should not surprise the student of the Pali suttas that this study does not elaborate on the numerous passages where the distinction between the two words or the meaning of one or the other is ambiguous. Indeed, in both classical and Buddhist Sanskrit as well as in the Pali literature, passages can be found where the usage of one appears to be interchangeable with the usage of the other. As I have suggested, however, my intent is not to offer a historical exegesis of viiiiiii1Ja and paiiiia, but an interpretation of the problem of levels of knowledge in Theravada Buddhism focusing on these terms as types.U In doing so we shall address ourselves to three basic questions: what meaning(s) do the terms hold as distinct but related forms of consciousness and modes of knowledge ; what is the nature of the relationship between the two; and, finally, do they presuppose each other as integral parts of the Buddhist salvation quest? These questions are basic to a consideration of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in the Pali suttas of Theravada Buddhism.
DISCRIMINATING KNOWLEDGE: VINNA~A
In studying the category of discriminating or analytical knowledge several terms will be discussed but none is more significant than viiiiiti1Ja. The Pali word like the Sanskrit one etymologically means to 'distinguish, discern, observe, investigate or know'. As has been demonstrated by Franklin Edgerton, there is no clear definition of the meaning of vijiiana in the writings of classical Sanskrit. In the Upani~ads for example, vijiiana sometimes appears as the form of knowledge necessary for the realization of ultimate reality ( cf. Katha IV.lS, Chandogya VIII.7.1), but it also appears in more mundane contexts such as the knowledge of snake charming ( cf. Chiindogya VII.S.l).
In the Pali canon, viiiiiii'}a is found to have several, differing meanings. It stands for "a mental quality as a constitutent of individuality, the bearer of (individual) life, life force . . . , general consciousness . . . (and) . . . may be characterized as the sensory and perceptive activity commonly expressed by 'mind' ". 12 0. H. de A. Wijesekera summarizes four basic ways in which vznna~a is used in the Pali canon: (a) cognitive or perceptive consciousness; (b) the surviving factor in the individual as denoted in particular by the term, sa1Jtvattanika viiiiili1Ja (the viiiiili~a that evolved) ; (c) the medium in which jhanic or spiritual progress takes place as implied by the expression viiiiia~a!fhiti (the stations of viiiiili1Ja) ; and (d) the basis of all consciousness and unconscious psychological manifestations pertaining to individuals within sarhsaric or empirical existence. 13 Each of these usages clearly applies to the life of the individual within the phenomenal world ; nevertheless, as the basis of cognition and perceptive consciousness and as part of the means by which spiritual progress is gained, viiiiia1Ja becomes an important mode of knowledge relating to the Theravadin's quest for salvation.
For the purposes of this study we shall focus on two fundamental uses of viiiiiatJa in the Pali Nikayas: viiiiia~a as consciousness or mind, and viiiiili1Ja as a mode of knowing. The fact that viiiiili~a is found to represent both a condition of consciousness as well as a type of knowledge will prove to be of the utmost significance.
Viiiiia1Ja as consciousness or mind is nearly synonymous with two other important terms in the Pali canon, citta, and mano. Citta refers to the center of man's emotional and intellectual nature. The Pali Text Society's dictionary states that such English expressions as "heart and soul" best capture the meaning of citta and that it refers especially to the conative and emotional side of thought. 14 As Mrs. Rhys Davids writes, "In citta we ... usually have man as affective and affected, as experiencing." 15 Mano, on the other hand, is said to represent the intellective function of consciousness, especially as it is expressed in valuing, measuring, purposing, and intending. 16 Viiiiili1Ja complements citta and mano by referring to perceptive and sensory activityP Despite these distinctions, however, in Samyutta Nikaya (II. 95), viiiiia1Ja, citta, and mano are equated and stand in opposition to kaya or body. 18 Let us assume then, without further elaboration, that in the Pali suttas the terms citta, mano, and viiiiili1Ja were used either synonymously or as essentially related aspects of the same empirical consciousness.
Two important characteristics of the empirical consciousness in early Buddhism demand our attention. The first is its impermanent nature, and the second may be characterized as the surviving factor in the individual within 13 Just as a monkey, brethren, faring through the woods, through the great forest catches hold of a bough, letting it go seizes another, even so that which we call thought, mind, consciousness, that arises as one thing, ceases as another, both by night and by day."19
Elsewhere in the suttas it is made abundantly clear that the impermanence of the empirical consciousness is a result of its connection with the senses. That is, empirical consciousness appears to be dependent upon conditions created by the attachment of the senses to sense objects. As Majjhima Nikaya !.259 puts it, "apart from condition there is no origination of consciousness." 20 The same sutta goes on to say that visual consciousness arises because of eye and material shapes; auditory consciousness arises because of ear and sounds; olfactory consciousness arises because of nose and smells ; gustatory consciousness arises because of tongue and tastes ; tactile consciousness arises because of body and touches ; mental consciousness arises because of mind and mental objects. 21 The consequences of the fact that viiiiili1Ja arises through contact between the sense organs and sense objects are significant. It raises the question of whether cognitive consciousness originates de novo from an empirical situation or simply begins to function when contact is made between the organ and the object of sense. Wijesekera supports the latter interpretation, insisting that the former would equate Buddhism with materialism in its theory of perception. 22 For our purposes, the most significant point stems from the fact that viiiiili1Ja functions only in relationship to objects of sense, hence, creating the possibility-if not the necessity-of consciousness being tied to the mundane or phenomenal world.
The dimension of this potential attachment to mundane objects is illustrated by the following passage from the Madhupi?Jrf,ika Sutta of the Majjhima Nikliya:
Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement (phassa) ; feelings ( vedanli) Here we find a direct connection between viiiiiii1Ja and papaiica, or consciousness and obsession, illusion, obstacle, impediment resulting from the perceptions (saiiiiii) which are rooted in contact (phassa) between sense organ and object. 24 The empirical world presupposed by these texts might well be described as an arena of sensory presentations in which external objects are dependent upon a cognizing consciousness and vice versa. The empirical world of things and objects is not conceived of as independent of their cognition, just as cognition is not seen isolated from the objects which are cognized. Mrs. Rhys Davids emphasizes this point in regard to the nature of the mind or consciousness by claiming that early Buddhism was not concerned with the "mind" but with "minding," that is, with mind in relationship to the objects of sensation and perception. 211 This conception of the phenomenal world as a dynamic process of the interaction of sense objects, sense organs, and sense consciousness factors is further illustrated by the development of the classification of the eighteen dhatus in later Pali literature. The dhatus, or fundamental bases of existence, include the six sense organs, their objects of contact, and the six forms of resultant consciousness ( viiiiiii1Ja).
If, as the suttas assume, empirical realities are dynamic and fluid fields of distinct forms of consciousness interacting with sensory objects, it follows that impermanence will be one of the characteristic traits of the phenomenal world. Since objects and consciousness are symbiotically related in a state of constant interdependence, it is impossible to discover any degree of permanence within the sensory realm. As E. R. Sarachchandra writes: "We perceive forms with our eyes, hear sounds with our ears and get attached to them. But the things we get thus attached to are constantly changing ... (and) the world of constant change has no permanent reality." 26 The "obsessed" (papaiica) consciousness is bound to objects of sensory perception, mistaking empirical objects as permanent entities when, in fact, they are only objects of consciousness changing from moment to moment as our perceptions of them change.
If the phenomenal world is viewed as partially or largely shaped by consciousness ( viiiiiii1;ta), then, on one level, consciousness functions as the medium in which empirical existence takes place. In this capacity viiiiiii1;ta has 361 the power to effect the origination or cessation of the world. 27 Another consequence is that vinnli1Ja becomes the sine qua non for the birth, growth, and development of conscious existence within the phenomenal world. 28 In a dialogue between Ananda and the Buddha in the Mahanidana Suttanta of the Digha Nikliya, for example, the Buddha states that viniili1Ja is the cause of name and form (nama rupa), that if consciousness ( viniili?Ja) were not to descend into the mother's womb there would be no birth, and that without consciousness there would be no further evolution of life. 29 This nearly quasi-substantive conception of viiiiili1Ja is, in the opinion of Wijesekera, also expressed in the terms, saf!tvattanika-viiinli1Ja (rebirth-consciousness), and viiiiia1_Za-sota (stream of consciousness) or bhava-sota (stream of becoming). 30 V iniili1Ja as mind or consciousness, in brief, is an expression of a mode of becoming, a condition characterized by diversity and impermanence. In this usage viiiiia1Ja does not mean full cognition but is " ... a sort of anoetic sentience that occurs before the object is completely apprehended." 31 At this level, viiiiili1Ja represents no formal power or control in and of itself, but rather the formless weakness and pain (dukkha) of disordered chaos. It is consciousness which arises when sense objects stimulate sense organs. Perhaps it could be said that at this stage viiiiili1Ja is merely reactive consciousness or awareness. It is, therefore, a state of nonfreedom, of dependence upon phenomenal diversity and bondage to the objects of sense. It is, as it were, a universal human condition from which man must extract himself.
The condition of bondage to plurality and impermanence is, indeed, the profane in its most radical connotation. The Theravadin's quest for salvation is to escape from this condition, to negate its threat of confusion and disorder. But where are the possibilities for creating a sacred cosmos from this chaos? Do they lie within man's own consciousness or is the source only to be found in some outside force? These questions bring us to a second basic use of viiiiili1Ja in the Pali Nikayas, namely, viiinatJa as a mode of knowledge.
Oues as to the nature of this knowledge are found throughout the suttas. For example in the Dhatu Vibhanga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, viiinatJa as the sixth dhatu beyond the five bases or elements of earth, water, fire, air and space is characterized as a knowledge which is able to distinguish between pleasure and pain, one of the fundamental dualities of the phenomenal world. 32 Sukha and dukkha refer not simply to pleasure and pain as psychological 27 Ibid. components of existence in the sensory world, but to its ontological character as well. Viiiiiii1Ja, therefore, as knowledge of the distinction between pleasure and pain or happiness and suffering, appears to be a discriminating mode of knowledge in regard to the true nature of reality. An identical use of viiiiiii1Ja is found in the Mahavedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya where it is said that by viiiiiii1Ja one discriminates the pleasurable from the painful and the neutral. 83 In the same sutta, the text goes on to say that viiiiiii1Ja is called knowledge because one discriminates by means of it ( vijanati ti . . . tasma viiiiiii1Jan ti vuccati) . 34 Furthermore in the Vimamsaka Sutta of the M ajjhima Nikaya it is said that "the Tathagata should be examined in order to know ( viiiiiii1Jiiya) whether he is perfectly enlightened or not." 35 Viiiiiii1Ja in these instances must be seen as a mode of knowledge or a cognitive state which, by its power of discrimination, has within itself the possibility of becoming more than mere sensory awareness. It has, in other words, at least some power of self-transcendence.
Viiiiiii1Ja in the Pali Nikayas, in brief, presents two different possibilities which fit well into our interpretative schema. It can mean, on the one hand, man's empirical consciousness which by nature is bound to the objects of sense. This level may be considered as the profane, when that which is most essential to human existence (that is, viiiiiii1Ja) is bound by its attachment to sensory objects and totally without self-controlling power. On the other hand, viiiiiii1Ja as a mode of knowledge implies that it has the power of transcending involvement in the sensory world; thus, in the Kevaddha Sutta of the D'igha Nikaya it is asked:
Where do earth, water, fire and wind, And long and short, and fine and coarse, Pure and impure, no footing find? Where is it that both name and form Die out, leaving no trace behind?
On that the answer is:
The intellect ( viiiiia1Ja) of Arahatship ... 36 It rests within viiiiiii1Ja itself to progress toward the ultimate. This progress is a result of knowledge attained through a discriminating understanding of the impermanent nature of the phenomenal world. 33 
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This progression is marked in particular by a scheme of spiritual training or meditation known as jhana or samiipatti, the context in which the question of saving knowledge arises. Without digressing into this arena, it will be merely noted that the acquisition of spiritual states is a refinement of consciousness ( viiiiiii1Ja). Such a progressive refinement is indicated by the so-called seven stations of consciousness. These describe the movement of viiiiia1Ja from consciousness of matter, to the dying out of the consciousness of sense-reaction, to the turning away from consciousness of the manifold, to the consciousness of infinite space, to the consciousness of infinite consciousness.37 Here is represented a freeing of viiiiia1Ja from attachment to the mundane to a more universal awareness of the nature of itself and of reality. Such liberation is denoted even more forcefully by other terms in the Pali Nikayas which must be briefly mentioned.
Viiiiia?Ja is able to rise above its bondage to the world of sense objects through the power engendered by objective analysis. This form of transcending knowledge, is illustrated by a cluster of related words denoting reflective cogitation, contemplative observation and rational discrimination. Among them are included such terms as, v'ima?J"sii, anupassanii, patisankha, pafisaiicikkhati, and peccavekkhati. 3 S Vima1Jtsii denotes consideration, examination and investigation. 89 In its use in the suttas it is frequently associated with the attainment of higher powers, praiseworthy concentration, and even insight into the nature of ultimate reality itself. Thus in D'igha Nikaya III.222, v'ima1Jtsii-samadhi is one of the four stages to iddhi or supranatural powers; in the Anguttara Nikaya mma?J"sii is described in "The Book of the Tens" as one of the conditions of the higher life of the Buddhist saint ; 40 and in Anguttara !.297, insight into the nature of the ultimate appears to be contingent on a detached examination ( vima?J"sii) of " ... resentment, infatuation, wrath, enmity, hypocrisy, delusion, treachery, stubborness, impetuosity, pride . . . (etc.) " 41 A nupassanii, denoting contemplation, observation, looking at, is also essential to the development of true wisdom. 42 " ... vision of things not taught before ... ," to knowledge, insight, wisdom and light. 44 A related term, samanupassanli, is seen to be integral to the means by which the hindrances ( nivara1Ja) blinding the individual to higher realities are overcome. 45 An important stage in the development of viniiii1Ja beyond bare sensory consciousness is the simple act of being objectively aware of particular human acts and activities, especially those conducive to the pleasure of the senses. Thus the Majjhima Nikaya admonishes the monk to reflect carefully (pafisankhii) while eating, and to think over (pafisaiicikkhati) the householder life. 46 Reflective thought is like a mirror which catches the image of every act and thought of the person; hence, the Buddha admonishes Rahula to reflect (paccavekkhati) again and again in doing every act, speaking every word, and thinking every thought. 47 The consequences of analytical and reflective thought, on the one hand, are ethical. By the power of discrimination ( bala pafi sankhiina) one abandons " ... immorality of deed in body, speech and thought ... and conducts himself in utter purity." 48 Patisankhiina, however, also leads to bhiivana, "cultivation," "making-become," which is conducive to yet higher goals of mindfulness and detachment. 49 Analytical or discriminative knowledge, therefore, represents not only self-conscious awareness or even rational understanding but is also the power by which the individual becomes "other" than he is. In discriminating, analytical thought inherent in consciousness ( vinnil1Ja) itself, there rests the power of changing the very structure of life. Through the attainment of knowledge, the individual is able to control his environment rather than be controlled by it. Viiinii1Ja comes to mean not merely a sensory consciousness dispersed among the multifarious and impermanent object-realities of the empirical world, but a consciousness which has analyzed and understood that world to the point of controlling and, hence, transcending it.
INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE: PANNA We have seen that vinna1Ja characterizes mundane existence both as the ground of sentient existence and as the means of enabling the individual to gain power 44 Ibid., 5: 157. 45 Digha Nikaya, 1:73. 46 Majjhima N ikaya, 1:273. 47 Ibid., 1:415. 48 The Book of Gradual Sayings, 1:47. 49 Ibid., 1:48. Mrs. Rhys Davids has discussed the word bhlivanli, in several of her writings. See her Sakya or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1931), p. 93£. Although she has been justly criticized for interpreting this and similar terms to mean becoming more of a "self," the notion of bhavanli as "making-become" or becoming other than what one presently is, represents a helpful interpretation. That is, early Buddhism clearly implies that right knowledge brings about a change of one's being. 365 over himself and his world. As a mode of knowledge, vinna1Ja functions soteriologically as a means to a higher reality. This reality, on one level of discourse, can be identified as nibbiina. As a polar term to vinna1Ja, however, it may also be discussed as intuitive knowledge or panna. In our usage, panna represents both the nature of consciousness vis-a-vis the ultimately real as well as the mode of knowing ultimate reality. Vinnii1Ja and panna are both forms of consciousness and modes of knowledge, although they differ in function and type. The function of viniia1Ja as a mode of knowledge is primarily to help control the consciousness through analytical and discriminating understanding of the empirical world. This control function is not an end in itself, but rather points beyond itself to a higher end or goal. Paiiiia, on the other hand, does not function as a control but rather as a release, a freeing of the consciousness to a knowledge of the Ultimate itself, a knowledge defying the categories of rational discrimination. In this sense paiiiiii may be classified as a nonrational, intuitive or a synthetic type of knowledge in contrast to viiiiia1Ja as a rational and analytical type.
In the Nikayas the condition of mundane existence is loss of freedom because consciousness ( viniiii1Ja) is bound to empirical objects through sensory perceptions ( saiiiia). It has been shown, furthermore, that vinna1Ja has the power within itself to rise above mere sensation to higher cognitive states. By means of rational analysis, viniiii1Ja perceives the implicit dualities and conflicts typical of the empirical world. It thereby progresses to higher and higher levels of understanding which, however, are still qualified by an inevitable attachment to the senses. Eventually a point is reached where this attachment is broken, and there emerges a new way of knowing and being.
The A11anjasappaya Sutta of theM ajjhima Nikaya discusses this progression and change in a form typical of the suttas. It points out that perceptions ( saniiii) related to sense desires (kama) are ruled by Mara, hence, resulting in an evil and inunoral consciousness. 50 This condition can be changed only when consciousness ( citta) is developed to a level of true permanence ( a1Jaiija) which is the highest attainment of wisdom (panna) . 51 As another passage in the Majjhima Nikaya puts it, perfect knowledge (anna) comes only through gradual training, 5 2 attainment, and progress. 5 3 One of the most obvious illustrations of the fact that panna results from an extended period of discipline and gradual training is the division of the Noble Eightfold Path into the categories of s'ila, samadhi, and panna. Wisdom or true knowledge (panna) is fully 50 Majjhima Nikaya, 3:262. 51 Ibid. achieved only at the conclusion of a period of development, the length of which depends upon the spiritual ability and the effort of the individual concerned.
The goal achieved by this progressive realization is above all a goal characterized by freedom ( vimutti). Again and again the suttas point to the fact that one who enters the way ( magga) to salvation has entered on the freedom of the consciousness ( cittovimutti), freedom through intuitive wisdom (pannavimutti) . 54 Such freedom is likened to abhinna, a suprarational knowledge, which is perfect. 55 The model of the religieu.x par excellence is one who is endowed with intuitive wisdom (panna) and freedom ( vimutti) or a "knowledge-vision-freedom" ( vimuttina1padassana) . 56 Freedom by itself is, of course, merely an abstraction and the Pali suttas are quite concrete about that from which the individual of intuitive wisdom is freed. In brief, the man of citto panna vimutti is freed from those attachments to the objects of the phenomenal world controlling his consciousness, blinding him to an awareness of his true nature and the world in which he lives, and proscribing his ability to transcend himself and his environment. The word used in the Pali texts for this binding attachment to the phenomenal world is asava, literally an "outpouring." Through ignorance (avijja), sensuous desire (kama), and the wish for becoming ( bhava) an individual is literally "poured out" into the material world. He is defined by all of the objects and immediate goals of the world of sensory reality; hence, a condition of freedom becomes absolutely impossible. Freedom in any religious tradition, of course, is more than merely freedom from. It is a freedom to as well. Early Buddhism is no exception to this rule. In this case it is a freedom to panna, a new insight ( vipassana) and seeingknowing ( na1pa-dassana). The individual who has attained to panna, having overcome the impediments of the senses, is enabled to know in a new way. It is a knowing no longer tied to the fields of sense, to sense objects and organs in the manner of empirical consciousness. Panna, then, represents the new consciousness of "rebirth" or transformation. It is the noumenal consciousness empowered to know not only the true nature of phenomenal reality, but ultimate reality itself. Because it represents a mode of consciousness like vinna1Ja, panna is able to perceive the ultimately real "face-to-face" just as vinna1Ja is able to perceive the phenomenal world as it really is. Panna, therefore has been called an extrasensory "seeing" ( dassana) or perception. 5 7 It is a form of perception in that it knows directly, but it is extrasensory in that it is not dependent upon the senses or the objects of sense.
367 the knowledge and insight of things as they are (yatha bhuta iiatJadassana) . 58 If you will, it is the acknowledgment of the impermanence ( anicca) of the phenomenal world and its inherent suffering ( dukkha), but from the perspective of the knowledge of nibbana rather than from the perspective of the mundane. It is possible for the empirical consciousness to arrive at a cognizance of the impermanence of the phenomenal world by rational methods, but until that knowledge is realized from the perspective of the ultimately real its consequences are limited. The knowledge of the nature of things is that aspect of paiiiia described in the two stages of the Noble Eightfold Path as right views and right intentions. Within the Theravada tradition it is most often characterized as the Four Noble Truths. Knowledge of the nature of things is not sufficient for salvation. It must be supplemented by the knowledge-and-vision of things, that is, absolute freedom ( vimutti-iiatJadassana) . It is the knowledge attained by the Buddha at his enlightenment when he is reported to have said, "there arose in me the knowledge and insight that my salvation is unshakable, that this is the last birth and that there is no further birth." 59 "Freedom-knowledge" complements "nature-of-things knowledge." The latter is the knowledge of things as they are empirically seen from the perspective of what they might become, whereas the former grasps this truth in the light of the ultimately real ( nibbiina). The insight of panna, therefore, may speak in descriptive terms of impermanence, conditionality and so on, but the "vision" aspect of panna makes only such simple assertions as emptiness ( sunna) and signlessness ( animittata).
As Edward Conze points out, the term sunna is not used in the Theravada tradition as extensively as anicca or impermanence ; 60 nevertheless, its limited use serves as an important means by which to indicate the vision aspect of panna. References occur in the Anguttara Nikaya where the Buddha is made to say that his discourses are " ... deep and deep in meaning, transcendental, dealing with the Void (sun nata) ... " ; 61 the Culasuiiiiata Sutta describes a method for the development of a true, changeless, and pure emptiness ; 62 and the .Akankheyya Sutta refers to the monk who is calmed ( samatha) and who has transcended every perceptual form as a "cultivator of empty places." 68 As the last reference indicates, suniia returns us to the notion of panna as freedom of the mind or consciousness ( cetovimutti). This freedom may be best delineated in the suttas in the sequence of appamiitJa (immeasurable), 58 For a discussion of vipassaniJ. by a contemporary meditation teacher see the detailed presentation by Ledi Sayadaw, " akiiicaiina (nothingness), suiiiiata (emptiness) and animittata ( signlessness) . 64 Suiiiiatacetovimutti or "freedom of the mind that is emptiness" refers to the fact that essential reality abides beyond the particulars of the phenomenal world. The above limited references appear to indicate that salvation-knowledge as suiiiia denotes not only the negation of form associated with phenomenal world but also a reality beyond form. Panna perceives this reality as suiiiiata, not mere emptiness, but as that ultimately real which gives meaning to the world of multiplicity.
Along with suiiiia or suiiiiata, the term animittatii ( signlessness) is an important nondescriptive indicator of the "freed mind" or consciousness ( cetovimutti) . 65 It denotes more than the inadequacy of the human intelligence to grasp the ultimately real. It implies, rather, that human consciousness operating on a higher level (that is, panna) can, indeed, know the ultimately real, that universal and absolute ground which by definition transcends the limits of finite knowledge.
Theravada Buddhism makes the optimistic claim that a man can know the ultimately real by his own efforts. To truly know this reality is to know it directly and to know directly assumes that one participates in that reality. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that salvation-knowledge or panna is described as a "seeing-knowing" ( iiiina-dassana) . Since what is "seen" is radically other than what is ordinarily perceived, the vision aspect of paiiiiii must also be radically other than the modes of knowledge appropriate to the mundane world. I£ this claim is accurate, that is, if panna as niina-dassana is decisively other than empirical consciousness or viiinaJJa, then the nature of the relationship between these two forms of knowing becomes a crucial question. Do they in some way complement each other or are they so radically different in nature and function that finally there is no relationship between the two? Writing in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, La Vallee Poussin uses a dialogue among the monks, Savittha, Musi:la, and Narada in the Samyutta Nikaya as a typology to represent two differing approaches to nibbiina, the rational and the mystical. In the dialogue Savittha asks Musi:la and Narada whether "apart from belief, apart from inclination, apart from hearsay, apart from argument as to method, apart from reflection on and approval of an opinion" did they have a knowledge of the conditioned nature of the phenomenal world and that the ceasing of it was nibbana. 66 Musila replied that he knew (janati) and saw (passati) ; hence, for him the hindrances ( asavas) to the ultimately real had been stripped away and he had attained to Arahatship. 369 Narada for his part, stated that he had the right insight that the "ceasing of becoming" was nibbana but that he was not an Arahat for whom the intoxicants had perished. 67 Louis de la Vallee Poussin comments:
"Musila et Niirada ... representent assez bien le 'rationalisme' et Ia 'mystique.' Musila possede 'la saintete' parce qu'il 'sait' ou 'connait.' Narada ne se considere pas comme un saint parce qu'il n'a pas touche le Nirv~u}.a avec son corps. On peut, sans imprudence, discerner dans les sources bouddhiques, anciennes ou scholastiques, deux theories opposees, ... la theorie qui fait du salut une oeuvre purement ou surtout intellectuelle; la theorie qui met le salut au bout des disciplines, ascetiques et extatiques." 68 Without venturing further into the details of La Vallee Poussin's argument, the general perspective that the "intellectual" and the "ecstatic" or "rational" and "mystical" are two opposing means to the ultimately real in Pali Buddhism is severely challenged by an analysis of vinnatta and panna.
One of the most important suttas in the Nikayas illustrating the nature of the relationship between the rational-analytical and the mystical-intuitive approaches to the ultimately real is the Mahlivedalla Sutta in the Majjhima Nikaya. There, in a dialogue between the venerable Siiriputta and Kotthita the Great, the issue of the relationship between "intuitive wisdom" (panna) and "discriminating consciousness" ( vinniit~a) is enjoined. A person is said to be "intuitively wise" when he comprehends suffering, the arising of suffering, and suffering's cessation. 69 Discriminating consciousness is so called because it discriminates ( vijanliti) pleasure and pain and what is not pleasure and pain. 70 Having so delineated the natures of panna and viniiatta, Kotthita asks Sariputta if the two are associated or dissociated, a question to which Sariputta replies, "That which is intuitive wisdom, your reverence, and that which is discriminative consciousness, these states are associated, not dissociated . . .. " 71 Within the soteriological quest the two forms of knowledge seem to presuppose one another so that, ultimately, any absolute distinction becomes impossible: "Whatever one comprehends . . . that one discriminates ; whatever one discriminates that one comprehends . . . ." 72 Accepting the proposition that viniiat~a and panna are associated Kotthita then asks in what way they differ. To this question Sariputta replies that panna is to be developed whereas viiiiiiitta is "for apprehending.'' 73 Perhaps this reply offers another way of expressing Jayatilleke's contention that viiiiiatta seems to apply to "cognition" in general, whereas paiiiia applies more specifically to the understanding and development of "spiritual truths."H In any case, this dialogue provides a specific illustration of the symbiotic relationship that may be said to exist between viiiiiatta and paiiiia in the suttas.
In conclusion, let me summarize what appears to be a recognizable and justifiable position vis-a-vis a typology of saving knowledge in the Pali suttas. Both viiiiiatta and paiiiia can be interpreted to mean consciousness, the former the consciousness apropos of the phenomenal and the latter apropos of the noumenal. V iiiiia~~a as empirical consciousness has an innate tendency to become attached to things and, hence, to lose its freedom. In fact, viiiiiatta cannot be conceived except in terms of sensory spheres, that is, consciousness, sense organs and sense objects. Within itself however, viiiiiatta has the power to rise above mere sensation or sensory perception. By analytic means it can recognize the impermanence and essencelessness of the phenomenal world. A higher reality, however, can only be assumed. Viiiiiatta cannot know the ultimately real itself precisely because this reality transcends the senses to which viiiiiatta is bound. It is at this point that paiiiia comes into the picture; for, whereas viiiiiatta might recognize the dualities of phenomenal reality (e.g., pleasure and pain), it cannot know the implications of these dualities from the perspective of the realization of nibbana. Paiiiia, as I have suggested, fulfills both of these functions. That is, paiiiia as the noumenal consciousness has a transcendental insight ( vipassana) into the nature of the phenomenal world, as well as a direct vision ( dassana) of the ultimately real. Paiiiia, therefore, represents the freeing of the mind or consciousness ( citto mano viiiiiatta vimutti) to an unlimited realization, the undesignated totality which the ground of being represents in all religious traditions.
Having developed such a seemingly definitive position, I must quickly reiterate a qualification made at the outset of this study. The Pali suttas do not present a consistent view of either viiiiiii1Ja or paiiiia. I have, therefore, within the limitations of my analysis, imposed a schematization or a typology on materials in the Pali texts that are, in fact, much more ambiguously defined. In defense of this interpretation, however, two points must be made: (a) there is support for the general position taken both within the suttas and by scholars of Buddhism; and (b) my primary purpose has not been to offer an exegesis of the Pali suttas but to arrive at an interpretative understanding of the soteriological nature and function of knowledge in Theravada Buddhism.
As a postscript to this interpretation of saving knowledge in the Pali suttas, a general comment might be in order regarding later developments in Buddhism. In the Pali sutta literature, I have contended that the two levels of
